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A number of countries have experienced terrorist attacks because of the al-Qaeda 
network and the global offensive that was launched against it. In North America 
there were the September 11, 2001 attacks in New York and Washington; In Eu-
rope, there was a terrorist attack in Madrid on March 11, 2004; in Bali, a number 
of Australian tourists died in a terrorist attack and so also in Jakarta, Indonesia 
when a car bomb exploded in front of the Australian Embassy. There have been 
several attacks in Asia and also multiple attacks in the Middle East. Besides, in the 
1990s there have been two brutal attacks on North American diplomatic buildings 
in Oriental Africa as well. 
However, so far there have been no terrorist attacks in Latin America which 
can be linked to the al-Qaeda or the global offensive against it. The only terrorist-
linked attack in Latin America  was directed against the Israeli mutual fund of Bu-
enos Aires, the AMNIA, a decade ago which was  seemingly carried out by an arm 
of the terrorist group Hamas (the Islamic Resistance Movement). 
However, though al-Qaeda related terrorism, which is worrying the rest of the 
world, has not touched Latin America, this continent has over the decades suffered 
diverse waves of terrorism. 
Terrorism from the Left  
With the victory of Salvador Allende in 1970, the beginning of this decade saw the 
Latin American left focusing more and more on legal electoral activities. Allende’s 
victory also opened a new avenue that could be used by the Left to ﬁght for po-
wer. Allende’s overthrow in 1973, however, changed the scenario and brought to 
the fore an armed conﬂict which this time had characteristics different from the 
ones that it had had in the past. The south cone of the continent became the epi-
center of an armed agitation by groups that challenged the established regime in 
an unprecedented and open manner. During this phase of the armed conﬂict, the 
mountains and forests which had been used by the guerrillas in the sixties, were 
replaced with big cities in the south of the continent and Montevideo, Buenos Ai-
res, Córdoba, Rosario and Santiago witnessed both intense subversive wars as well 
as those undertaken against the subversives. During this decade there was another 
change in the character of the armed conﬂict: the peasants who constituted the 
guerilla ﬁghters in the sixties were replaced by more politically educated ﬁghters 
from the urban middle classes.   
These guerilla ﬁghters were inﬂuenced by terrorists who had made their pre-
sence felt in Europe and the Middle East during this decade. The most prominent 
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of these were the pro-Palestinian groups who undertook well planned and carefully 
executed violent attacks against prominent people or against prominent or sensitive 
places. The intelligence with which these attacks were planned and the effective 
manner in which they were executed, captivated the guerrillas in South America. 
Drawing their inspiration from the pro-Palestinian groups, the guerrillas in Latin 
America undertook unprecedented terrorist activities like kidnapping entrepreneurs, 
ofﬁcials and airplanes and capturing embassies. The force with which these attacks 
were executed and the publicity that they got, for the guerrillas not only showed the 
government’s weakness in dealing with such attacks, it also got the guerrillas a lot 
of money. The kidnapping of the Born Impresarios, Fiat’s president in Argentina and 
the capture of the Dominican Republic embassy in Colombia got millions of dollars 
for the guerrillas – something they had not even dreamt of getting in the past. 
Besides, these high-proﬁle attacks also gave birth to new groups of terrorists in 
South America and some guerrillas also started making their presence felt in rural 
areas. This in turn also had an impact on urban terrorism. The M-19 in Colombia, 
Alfaro Vive Carajo in Ecuador and the Revolutionary Movement Túpac Amaru, MRTA, 
in Peru followed the tactics used in the south by the Montoneros, Tupamaros and 
ERP very effectively in their countries.  
Ideologically, the insurgent groups during this phase of urban war were less 
dogmatic and less committed to international currents of Marxism. Therefore, 
groups like Marxists, Trotzkites, Peronists and nationalists were united not by ide-
ology but by the methods that they used.   
However, even though these terrorist attacks were effective, they had their li-
mits. Terrorism did lead to destabilization but it did not have too much of a long-
term impact as the attacks were not sustained with an eye towards taking over 
the establishment.
At the same time, it was much more difﬁcult for these groups to operate in 
cities as chances of their being exposed were much greater. Equally signiﬁcantly, 
instead of being able to get the support of any important social or political sector 
for their ﬁght, the terrorist attacks led to the suppression of both these sectors as 
they were considered to be close to terrorist groups. Hence, terrorism only came 
to be considered as an effective tool for destabilizing governments and achieving 
other tactical beneﬁts like getting prisoners released, demanding money or high-
lighting certain political demands. The secrecy with which these groups operated 
and the violence that they used in their activities,  worked against them when it 
came to certain strategic earnings aimed at taking over power. Terrorism could 
destabilize governments but it could not get the same power as the destabilized 
government to the terrorists. 
State Terrorism: The Doctrine of National Security  
On its part, the regimes in power adopted severe counter-insurgency methods which 
were extremely effective in the south cone of the continent. The counter-insur-
gency steps, however, involved brutal methods and led to the killing of thousands 
of innocent citizens and deep divisions within societies. 
Since there was no opposition or articulation of opinions against these drastic 
counter-insurgency methods, which were even tolerated as effective tools against 
communism, the sixties and the seventies were characterized by military and au-
thoritarian rule in the continent.    
Little wonder, then, that during this time a military doctrine was being put in 
place. Though there was no homogeneity in the thought behind the doctrine and 
though it did not have any speciﬁc guidelines, there were some initial basic ideas 
which were discussed and elaborated upon in several centers of military thought 
on the continent. The most signiﬁcant of these was the Inter American School of 
Defense where high military ofﬁcials from the continent got together and served 
as a receptacle for these diverse ideas.  
“In almost all the cases two important doctrines were disputed the thought of 
most of the controls military Latin Americans that at the time that they confronted 
the guerrilla also they overthrew democratic governments. The smaller importance 
inﬂuence was the North American doctrine of contra-insurgency and the biggest 
inﬂuence came from the French doctrine of the “Revolutionary War”. Of the two 
inﬂuences the second has a vision of metaphysical crusade, with deep roots in the 
French Catholic thought, with the vision of the army as the guardian of the nation’s 
essence threatened by the incompetence, indecision and weakness of the liberal 
democracies; and the open justiﬁcation of the torture like the instrument of the 
arsenal against-rebel’s, were from a distance the most inﬂuential” 1
   To Colombian political scientist Francisco Leal “the creation of the doctrine 
was the work of some few South American countries, especially Argentina, Brazil 
in smaller degree and a little bit later, Chile. By the other hand Peru also made its 
1  Gustavo Gorriti. “Commentary on Utopia Unarmed. Beyond the Epics of Failure: The Post Utopian 
Left, in: Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs. Vol. 36, No. 1, 1994. Pp.13.
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contribution through of a very peculiar variant.  The military coup of 1964 in Bra-
zil was the initial point of a new rationale in the Latin American political proces-
ses. The subsequent Argentinean military intervention of 1966 conﬁrmed the new 
characteristics, which consolidated progressively with the Peruvian coup of 1968, 
and the Chilean and Uruguayan coups of 1973 and Argentinean coup of 1976. The 
particularities of this rationale were being identiﬁed little by little. In the decade 
of the seventies the Doctrine of National Security was generalized.”2  
Leal elaborates on the characteristics of this doctrine starting from the original 
text of Costa Pinto. According to him, once the military starts intervening as a cor-
poration in different areas it takes on the role of the state. However, the military’s 
interference in different areas leads to uncertainty which in turn creates a politi-
cal, institutional and ethical void. The military, however, believes that it is the only 
organized political force which can integrate the nation.  In such a situation, the 
relationship between the military and the political institutions is marked by the 
weakness of the latter and not by the force of the former. When political forces 
lose control over power, they project an image of the country being threatened by 
chaos. This leads to the formation of a civil group which offers and elaborates on 
the ideological justiﬁcation for military intervention.  
  In Latin America, the army being given the label of ‘crusaders’ also had to do 
with certain international developments including the huge defeat of  the French 
colonial army in Dien Bien Phu (Indochina) and the immense political and military 
difﬁculties that America, the biggest military power in the world, was facing  in the 
war  in Vietnam. These developments made it clear to the military in Latin America 
that mere military force was not enough to contain the spread of communism. For 
this to be achieved it was also necessary to have political power. They saw that the 
popularity of the Cuban revolution grew in Latin America, not only because it was 
a success, but because it also led to the coming up of student movements. 
There were those in Latin America who saw the threat of communism encom-
passing the entire continent as a real possibility. At the same time, they also rea-
lized that they could not expect effective help from the United States which had 
enough difﬁculties, both military and political, of its own. Hence, this school of 
thought realized that they would have to ﬁnd their own solutions to communism. 
It was a result of this thinking which allowed the military to take control – either 
directly or indirectly – of key sectors of the state. 
  This military doctrine was applied in different ways by different countries. In 
Brazil it took on a more elaborate form where it was able to harmoniously solve 
internal problems by establishing a relief formula for the military administration 
so that it would not become personalized and in Argentina, Chile and Peru extreme 
versions of the doctrine were applied. In Uruguay, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras 
and El Salvador this doctrine was applied in a fragmentary form. In some other 
countries, including some democracies, the inﬂuence of this thought was more 
ideological than operative. But whatever the form, but this doctrine was practi-
cally extended to all the armed institutions on the continent. As a result, though 
the implementation of the national security doctrine was not uniform all across 
the continent and it changed to accommodate the particularities of different na-
tions it did come to be taken as a way of governing Latin America in this half of 
the century.  
The Militarization of the State:  
The Narrowing Down of Freedoms
Some of the political consequences of this model of governance were that it led to 
power being centralized in the executive. The congresses in the different countries 
were either totally closed down or were partially replaced by emergency legislati-
ons. Further, the judiciaries, too, were either fully or partially closed down because 
of the creation of military tribunals for judging civilians. 
At the same time, the scope of the executive increased as it was given more 
police powers and higher budgets. These in turn led to more beneﬁts. In many 
countries, political parties were not allowed to operate and freedom of speech was 
totally done away with. This resulted in the opposition being totally silenced. Stra-
tegically this shift of power also meant that the military now directly controlled the 
economic sectors, production areas and also other services. The navy, aeronautical 
and chemical industries, banks and radio stations formed a conglomerate in some 
countries which was controlled by the military. 
This form of governance survived in many countries till the end of their military 
regimes. It was adopted by some democracies as well.  The duration of the state 
of emergency in Colombia for almost forty years practically without interruptions; 
enormous police powers given to the executive in Venezuela; and a conglomerate 
of companies and banks being run by military forces in Mexico are examples of a 
doctrine which became the instrument of governments. It extended its scope bey-
ond the anti-communist military environment and it even worked during that half 
of the century within a maintained democratic electoral system.   
2  Francisco Leal Buitrago. El Oﬁcio de la Guerra. La Seguridad Nacional en Colombia. TM Editores, 
1994. Pps. 30 y 31.
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The militarization of society, as deﬁned by British historian John Keegan, is a 
concept according to which the capacity to make war becomes the reason for un-
dertaking it. “Militarism is a concept that presupposes the existence of an army like 
a dominant institution but separated from other social institutions”, he says. The 
argument used to justify this thinking is that it was the armies which won indepen-
dence for Latin American countries and hence it was the military which preceded 
the creation of states and therefore it became a savior of countries in danger.  
This thought when it made its presence felt during the Cold War was, howe-
ver, not something new as its roots can be traced back to  the authoritarian poli-
tical traditions of the twentieth – and even the nineteenth – centuries. During the 
time of the Cold War, it was pursued with greater vigor to ﬁght the main threat of 
communism.  Discussing the genesis of this thinking Keegan adds that more than 
80 per cent of the Spanish American constitutions in the nineteenth century assi-
gned the mission of protecting the constitution to the armed forces, making it in 
a certain sense the fourth public power. 
According to Keegan, the second half of the nineteenth century was marked 
by concerns about security in a more restricted sense: the survival or the physical 
security of the nation-states. However, the essentially military nature of the thre-
ats faced by the countries at this time conﬁgured a military leadership as much in 
politics as in security thought, which articulated, among other things, a vision of 
the armed forces being saviors ﬁghting a supranational enemy. In many countries, 
the leadership used the army for providing a defense against threatening exter-
nal forces. This defense came at the expense of political and juridical powers and 
brought a host of abuses and brutality in its wake. During this time the military 
also assumed a larger role in matters of national security because there was either 
none or very little contribution from the other sectors. The identiﬁcation of the con-
cept of national security with the military establishment on the one hand, and the 
preponderance of the military in generating a vision for the country on the other, 
made intellectuals in Latin America averse to the idea of ﬁnding alternatives when 
it came to security. Hence, no alternatives were found for providing security at that 
time. Further, the ideological division between communism and anti-communism 
promoted the unanimity that the military was the only option for national securi-
ty. What should also be stressed here is that the absence of any discussion on the 
concept of security also in some ways inhibited individual freedoms.   
Coming to the period under discussion, the role of the armed forces as guar-
dians of constitutions was not only maintained during the Cold War in national 
security regimes, but in several cases, also after the constitutional modiﬁcations 
that accompanied the transitions to democracy were made at the end of the 1980s 
and in the 1990s. 
The Eruption of Illicit Drugs
A part of the American continent has been especially shaken by the growth in the 
consumption of illegal drugs among North Americans. In the sixties the consump-
tion of psycho-tropical drugs increased the use of marijuana and its derivatives in 
particular. In the beginning these drugs could be traced to Mexico and the Carib-
bean, and in the early seventies North American authorities declared what was the 
ﬁrst war against drug use as a result of which cultivations of marijuana in these 
regions was eradicated. When this happened, drug trafﬁckers found cultivation 
areas in the Colombian forests in the south. This led to another war against drugs 
in the mid-seventies.  As a result of this war, Colombia, which was then the main 
supplier of marijuana to the United States, became a marginal producer. However, 
the cultivation of these drugs as a result of this war moved to North American 
territories. 
Marijuana, however, soon ceased to be important in international drug trafﬁ-
cking circles and was replaced by cocaine in the eighties, which became a serious 
problem in the United States because of its high consumption among adults and 
among young people from the high and middle classes. Trafﬁckers in Colombia re-
sponded to this new demand and in the eighties, they had already captured 80 per 
cent of the market in the north. To begin with, they used the same channels that 
they had used for marijuana but later they exploited new connections and routes 
and penetrated the North American market to the south of Florida in a big way.  
Given the huge demand for illicit drugs it did not take long for cartels to be 
formed in the drug trafﬁcking. From scattered trafﬁckers the drug trade became a 
business which had its own agreements about quotas that had to be supplied and 
division of work vis-à-vis procurement and distribution of drugs.  Small producers 
and salespersons were either eliminated or were integrated with organizations 
which had large capitals and strong armed presence. This cartelization of the drug 
trade became a powerful international organization indulging in crime and its ra-
miﬁcations were felt in several countries. Since the drug trade was being run as 
a business, it involved undertaking various innovations for expanding the market. 
Since cocaine is an expensive drug, the trafﬁckers developed a cheaper but more 
addictive sub-product in crack. With the introduction of crack, the drug market 
expanded and now even included the relatively poor African-American neighbor-
hoods in the US.
In the beginning of the nineties cocaine was supplied following a simple struc-
ture.  The coca leaves were cultivated in Bolivia and Peru and in the ﬁelds these 
leaves were converted into paste following a simple manufacturing process. This 
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paste was then transported to Colombian forests. This paste was chemically trea-
ted in these forests and the trafﬁckers got cocaine in its ﬁnal form which was then 
transported mainly towards the North American markets. However, this decade saw 
the structure of the business changing because thanks to the war against drugs a 
part of the cultivation ﬁelds in Bolivia were destroyed and fungus deteriorated the 
Peruvian coca ﬁelds. As a result most of the production of coca leaves was moved 
to Colombia. The Colombian authorities were quick to act against this development; 
the cartels were dismantled and their bosses imprisoned. This necessitated the cre-
ation of new cartels in Mexico which replaced those that had been functioning in 
Colombia so far. These new cartels also had greater access to the North American 
market and Europe and Brazil became important consumers of cocaine.
Organized crime based on illicit drug trade has affected several Latin American 
societies deeply. The media, which was highlighting this problem, was attacked often 
and in some societies there was no access to an impartial and fair judiciary.  The 
Colombian case is an exception to this where tribunals and jueces sin rostro have 
now settled down and mechanisms have been authorized to protect the identity of 
witnesses. All this has been a  consequence of the threats and attacks on judicial 
ofﬁcials on behalf of those involved in organized crime in drug trafﬁcking.
However, in other countries, protecting judicial ofﬁcials, ensuring the inde-
pendence of the judiciary in the face of armed threats and assuring that justice is 
done is believed to collide with an infringement of human rights. The dilemma in 
this argument is clear: to protect the independence of the judiciary some extraor-
dinary measures need to be taken against the armed groups. But these in turn can 
be considered an infringement of their rights.
The ﬁght against terrorism also faces a similar dilemma. Protecting society too 
can mean temporary restrictions being placed on rights. In my opinion, the biggest 
risk here is that the ﬁght against terrorism and the ﬁght against organized crimes pro-
vides the easy option of appealing to military forces to deal with these problems.
The Armed Forces and Democracy  
in Latin America today  
Since it is the beginning of a long decade of Latin America returning to democracy 
it seems inappropriate to draw a balance sheet of what has been achieved and what 
is lacking when it comes to the role of the armed forced in a democratic context. 
However, what can be said is that starting from the eighties, attempts were 
made and instruments of action were put in place in cases where there was a dan-
ger to the democratic system.  Not only did the hemispheric organization adopt the 
principle of defense of the democracy but its member states have also assumed their 
positions for themselves. The United States, which had been the main supporter of 
anti-communist dictatorial regimes during the Cold War is now providing a prop 
in defense of democracy. American countries have approved the Inter-American 
Democratic Letter which establishes more action being taken to defend democra-
cies. In such a scenario, no space is provided either for coups to grab power or to 
other anti-democratic authoritarian measures.
It is, however, difﬁcult to deﬁne how successful these efforts will be because 
there are no  pre-established parameters to discern which decisions could lead to 
constitutional ruptures and which would not, especially when it comes to subtle 
matters. It is also difﬁcult to discern whether some measures have an apparent 
democratic robe. MERCOSUR, for example, has adopted a democratic clause that 
excludes any country that adopts a dictatorial régime from the association.   
These attitudes have without doubt inhibited the occurrence of ruptures caused 
by force in America. The frequency of military interventions (or coups) in democratic 
processes has decreased. However, it should be kept in mind that this has more to 
do with the coups and military interventions being considered illegitimate in the 
international context than with transformations within their own forces.  
At the same time, the possibility of military coups may have reduced but this 
does not mean that they have been discarded as a possibility for creating desta-
bilization. Let us remember the devastating effect of the two intended coups in 
Venezuela in 1992 that ﬁnally lead to the end of the Venezuelan political régime 
which was found to be dominated by the promoters of the coups. In Paraguay 
the military movements in favor of general Oviedo failed, but democratic stability 
cracked. Even if the possibility of the success of an operation is low and there is 
near zero possibility of a military coup being recognized internationally it does not 
mean that we should ignore the noxious effects that this kind of a movement can 
have, even if it fails, for democracy. 
It would be necessary to promote some multilateral measures to disqualify 
those who try to tunnel democratic regimes, because the messages are sometimes 
confused. Just to mention one example: the treatment given by Brazil to Oviedo 
is not encouraging for the Paraguayan democrats. It is for this reason that some 
procedures that reinforce the isolation of those involved in a coup, even if it is not 
a success, need to be contemplated in the Democratic Letter of the OAS.
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Further, military intervention in the democratic process does not only mean 
the use of force. There are at least two modalities which need to be analyzed with 
caution. The ﬁrst is the use of intelligence organizations by civil governments, with 
purposes of knowing, to watch over, or to tunnel the legal movements of the op-
position. The case of Montesinos, which resulted in sustaining a formal democratic 
regime, shows the kind of subtle intervention that is possible without resorting to 
the use of force. Another modality of military intervention in the democratic system 
is the one that is being used in Venezuela. It consists of granting certain tasks of 
social and political mobilization to the armed forces. This puts opposition parties 
at a disadvantage and places the armed force in a plane of open political compe-
tition, which in turn generates evident risks of polarization and the manipulation 
of the armed institutions by the executive.
Military Reforms and the Challanges  
of Terrorism and Organized Crime
The end of the Cold War, the peace agreements in Central America and the acknow-
ledgement of external threats to democratically elected governments has meant 
a modiﬁcation in the defense and security calendars of most of the countries in 
the region. A change in the historical perspective of the neighbor being the main 
threat to a country’s security has also led to a reduction in tensions in the region. 
For example, Argentina and Brazil modiﬁed their conceptions of mutual threat and 
canceled their respective nuclear programs. Peru and Ecuador after a brief border 
clash reached an agreement that ended ﬁve decades of high tension. Though many 
border controversies remain without being resolved even today it can be said that 
security perceptions  have been modiﬁed and issues like the protection of the en-
vironment,  ﬁght against drug trafﬁcking and  prevention of natural disasters have 
become new concerns in the security calendars in the region.  
Civic insecurity has notably grown in almost all the countries in the region 
in the last decade. In some countries this growth is attributed to the presence of 
democracy and in other countries in Central America it is attributed to peace. Pa-
radoxically these two advances have exposed criminal manifestations to a higher 
degree. The explosion in drug trafﬁcking in its diverse manifestations, too, is a re-
cent phenomenon in many nations.
This has had a further implication: there has been a change in the proﬁle of 
military forces. Since police bodies are virtually non-existent in the region, this 
has meant that military bodies have been undertaking the tasks of the police. The 
North American example in this context does not help much because their police 
model cannot be adapted to the institutional realities in Latin American. It would 
be highly advisable that national centralized police bodies, with the tradition and 
credibility enjoyed by them in some European countries, provide institutional con-
sultancy and help in the preparation of ofﬁcial police bodies in Latin America. 
The kind of changes that have been discussed - both brieﬂy and in detail – in 
this paper are just the tip of the iceberg when it comes to the changes that are 
needed in the military in Latin America because changes within the military in-
stitutions alone will not guarantee a horizon free of interruptions to democratic 
processes.
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